were completed and if the development work showed promise, OSD-BMC wanted a full-scale review before a missile development program was initiated 40 . As the Navy progressed in its solid propellant study, they became more and more removed from adapting the JUPITER to shipboard application, for a shorter missile was their desire. This meant a separate weapon system development, so in cooperation with the Lockheed Missile Division, a study was started toward such aims. One of the critical factors to be considered in making the decision, from the standpoint of DOT and the President, was whether or not a 1 1/2 year delay for the operational date could be accepted 41 . Secretary Wilson's decision on the course of Navy IRBM development was made on 8 December 1956. At that time the Navy was authorized to delete from its program the liquid-propelled JUPITER, and to proceed with the development of the POLARIS IRBM with submarine application as first priority. This action, of course, prompted the dissolution of the JANBMC and the formation of the Army Ballistic Missile Committee (ABMC) with the Secretary of Army serving as chairman 42 . Withdrawal by the Navy from the Army program was not simultaneous, for there were many areas where the two services had common interests. In fact, the Navy mentioned several, especially in the nose cone recovery efforts. Moreover, Navy Special Project Office asked its office at ABMA to determine the extent _____________________________

40. Memo, DOD to JANBMC, 4 Apr 56, subj: OSD-BMC Action with Respect to the Navy Solid Propel Pro, Hist Off files 41. Memo, BuOrd, Dept of Navy, 4 Dec 56, subj: Mins of Staff Mtg- 27 Nov 56, Hist Off files. 42. JUP Chronology; Memo, DOD to JANBMC, 18 Dec 56, subj: Dissolution of JANBMC; Msg, COFORD to ABMA, 20 Dec 56, subj: Org of ABMC, Hist Off files. .