would be deployed would have little room for maneuvering. The Air Force was pinning all of its plans on attaining a 15-minute readiness capability for all weapons. ABMA did see some future in the turn of events occasioned by the Air Force's reorganization in that it would now be a contractor for an operational user and would not have to extensively coordinate with a lateral development agency to reach the user. In this respect, thought was given to the possibility of certifying a liaison office to the SAC element in charge of the IRBM missile program 54 . By mid-December, the picture as to the eventual use of the JUPITER became a little clearer through an Air Force briefing presented in Washington. Deployment plans called for four squadrons, with the first squadron being equipped with six launchers and 15 missiles. Six missiles would be fired in 30 minutes, and the remainder within 2 1/2 hours. Thereafter, the succeeding squadrons would have 15 launchers and 15 missiles, all capable of firing within 15 minutes. Other stipulations included Air Force manning, capability to deploy to strategic locations (some notice of mobility), capability of continuous operation, minimum vulnerability, and fast reaction time (15-minute salvo). The Army was still dubious about the lack of mobility and being able to deploy by December 1958, unless Army personnel were used to man the system 55 . Subsequent to the briefing, Secretary Brucker forwarded a memo to the Secretary of the Air Force outlining Army plans to meet Air Force requirements. Again, the question was raised as to the ability to deploy in _____________________________

54. Msg, (ABMA/AFBMD 6171, ABMA FIDO at AFBMD to ABMA, 6 Dec 57, subj: Info on THOR/JUP Plans & SAC Plans, Hist Off files. 55. Msg, Col T. T. Paul to Gen Medaris, 17 Dec 57, subj: AF Planning