Major problem areas covered in the tentative November plans began to be resolved, in part, by January 1956. During that month General Medaris met with General Schriever of WDD and came to an agreement on the allocation of NAA motors to ABMA. Also within the month emergency construction was started at the Cape in support of the missile flight testing programs 33 . Although progress had been made by concluding the engine agreement, ABMA was not satisfied with the situation as it applied then or would apply in the succeeding years. WDD had allocation control from the NAA source, and ABMA felt that it needed direct contractual relationship in order for an engine to be produced that would meet the needs of the JUPITER system. General Medaris expressed these feelings to General Schriever, and the latter replied that he did not foresee any difficulty in the procurement of engines for the JUPITER program through a military interdepartmental procurement request (MIPR) to WDD. General Schriever went on to say that he would extend every consideration possible, "short of those which might engender delays in the ICBM and IRBM programs ..." The qualifying phrase bothered ABMA, for it appeared to say that JUPITER had a second rather than equal priority to the other IRBM. This was not the only item that ABMA was unsatisfied with, as the only contractors (NAA and Aerojet General) for powerful thrust engines had their capabilities saturated with requirements to fill orders for the four major ballistic missile programs. ______________________________

33. JUP Dev Plan, FY 1958, 29 Sep 56.